

An approach to the notion of responsibility in Jean Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan

Una aproximación a la noción de responsabilidad en Jean Paul Sartre y Jacques Lacan
Uma abordagem à noção de responsabilidade em Jean Paul Sartre e Jacques Lacan

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Abstract

The notion of responsibility has an unavoidable centrality in the vast work of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. This can be seen in his philosophical works as well as in his literary novels and various short stories. On the other hand, in the extensive teaching of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan there are also developments linked to the notion of responsibility from the different edges immanent to the field of belonging. Thus, the main purpose of this research is to address key elements of the work of each of these authors that allow us to establish an approach to the notion of responsibility that they develop. This will allow, in a second moment, to make a parallelism between Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan in relation to responsibility that privileges the similarities and divergences between the perspectives of these authors who historically coexisted in the field of responsibility.

Keywords: Responsibility; Existentialism; Psychoanalysis; Subject; Lacan; Sartre.

Resumen

La noción de responsabilidad presenta una centralidad insoslayable en la vasta obra del filósofo francés Jean-Paul Sartre. Esto se observa tanto en sus obras filosóficas, como en sus novelas literarias y relatos varios. Por otra parte, en la extensa enseñanza del psicoanalista francés Jacques Lacan también existen desarrollos ligados a la noción de responsabilidad desde las diferentes aristas immanentes al campo de pertenencia. De este modo, la presente investigación tiene como objeto principal abordar elementos primordiales de la obra de cada uno de estos autores que permitan establecer una aproximación a la noción de responsabilidad que ellos desarrollan. Esto permitirá, en un segundo momento, realizar un paralelismo entre lo expuesto por Jean-Paul Sartre y Jacques Lacan en relación a la responsabilidad que privilegie las similitudes y divergencias entre las perspectivas de estos autores que coexistieron históricamente

Palabras Clave: Responsabilidad; Existencialismo; Psicoanálisis; Sujeto; Lacan; Sartre.

Resumo

A noção de responsabilidade é um tema central inevitável na vasta obra do filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre. Isto pode ser visto nas suas obras filosóficas assim como nos seus romances literários e vários contos curtos. Por outro lado, no extenso ensino do psicanalista francês Jacques Lacan, há também desenvolvimentos ligados à noção de responsabilidade a partir dos diferentes aspectos imanentes ao campo de pertença. Assim, o principal objectivo da presente investigação é abordar elementos fundamentais do trabalho de cada um destes autores que nos permitam estabelecer uma aproximação à noção de responsabilidade que eles desenvolvem. Isto permitirá, num segundo momento, fazer um paralelismo entre as declarações de Jean-Paul Sartre e Jacques Lacan em relação à responsabilidade que privilegia as semelhanças e divergências entre as perspectivas destes autores que historicamente coexistiram no terreno.

Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade; Existencialismo; Psicanálise; Assunto; Lacan; Sartre.

Javier Agostinelli

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1331-7926>

Licenciatura en Psicología
Especialización en psicología clínica con
orientación psicoanalítica
Universidad de Buenos Aires
agostinelli.javier@gmail.com

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INTRODUCTION

The notion of responsibility has been addressed in the field of philosophy by numerous authors throughout its history. Some of the most renowned in the discipline, such as Kant and Nietzsche, have dealt with its incidence on the human being, its effects and real scope. Thus, Jean Paul Sartre is one of the philosophers of the twentieth century who paid particular interest in responsibility as a significant element of human existence. So much so that he referred to it directly in several passages of his work, such as, for example, in the famous 1945 lecture - which was later transformed into a book - called "Existentialism is a humanism". This work will be taken as a reference in this research because it provides a general and concise overview of Sartre's philosophical thought.

Similarly, responsibility is also located in chapter one of the fourth part of "Being and Nothingness" where Sartre (1943/2011) devotes a section called "Freedom and Responsibility". Similarly, his novels and plays with their respective and diverse characters deal with questions that have as their direct content the problem of responsibility in the human being. This can be seen in his 1938 novel - possibly the author's most successful - called "La nausea" (Sartre, 1938/2015) with the famous character named Antoine Roquentin, who must rightly face and take responsibility for the contingent emergence of the feeling of nausea in his own existence. It can be said, then, that responsibility - together with freedom, although it is not the central theme of this work - in the author's novels, as well as in the plays and essays, forms an underlying structure that operates and influences in a categorical way the logic that energizes them, even when it may not be named in a manifest way by Sartre.

On the other hand, in the teaching of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan it is possible to identify some elements that allude directly or indirectly to the notion of responsibility. This is observed, not only in the transcription on paper of his famous seminars given in different French institutions attended by a certainly heterogeneous public, but also in his published writings. However, given the immanent character of the field, that is, what concerns psychoanalysis as a practice, it is necessary at least initially to discriminate between what could be, on the one hand, the responsibility imposed on the analysand - the patient undergoing a psychoanalytic cure - and, on the other hand, the responsibility relative to the psychoanalyst. That is to say, responsibility in this case can be approached from two angles, which although logically have an intimate relationship, they do not carry the same meanings, allusions or competences. Thus, responsibility in the field of psychoanalysis - both from the perspective of the analyst and from that of the psychoanalyst - is inseparable from an ethical structure that encompasses all the senses of its practice. On the other hand, in the same way as with Sartre's work, it happens with Lacan's developments that it is possible to notice the notion of responsibility as an element present even when it may not be manifestly referenced by the author. However, this does not prevent an exegesis from being carried out on the basis of specific elements of the author's work, some of which will be taken up here. A clear proof of this is that in the field of psychoanalysis the notion of responsibility throughout its history has given rise to heated debates with discordant positions among its various exegetes. Following this, this research will use some of Lacan's works contained in his famous Writings I and II (published in France in 1966 with great success) such as "Science and truth", "The direction of the cure and the principles of its power", among others. Contributions from "The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III: Psychosis" and "The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis" will also be included. However, it should be clarified that the deliberate choice of these segments of the French psychoanalyst's work does not exempt that other passages could also be used, such as, for example, "The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis".

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bro: II: The Ego in Freud's theory and psychoanalytic technique" or even "The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis", among others.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is, in the first instance, to establish an approach to the concepts of responsibility that emerge from Sartre's and Lacan's works. This will allow us, in a second instance, to establish a parallelism that privileges the similarities and differences between the two authors' perspectives. It should not be overlooked that Sartre and Lacan not only coexisted historically, but also that they participated in a twentieth century France that was deeply marked by very powerful and significant political, social and historical debates. Nor should it be ignored that this coexistence was not without real incidences or tinged with innocuousness, but on the contrary, both were aware of the work of the other, that is, there is an intertextuality that is verified, for example, in the allusions that Lacan makes in his seminars and writings on the work of Sartre. Following this, there are authors who worked on the differences and similarities between the works of these authors, as Sara Vasallo (2006) did, who dealt with this theoretical intersection with precision. Along similar lines, Élizabeth Roudinesco (2016) wrote the biography of the French psychoanalyst where significant elements of the complex relationship with Sartre and fundamentally the influence of the latter on Lacan's teaching are detailed.

DEVELOPMENT

1.- Responsibility in atheistic existentialism.

The conference given by Sartre in 1945 called "Existentialism is a humanism", generated a great stir in the circle of intellectuals in France. The figure of Sartre at that time was of great importance for sectors of French culture and intellectual thought. Existentialism as a philosophical current was in full swing in that country, giving rise to numerous debates, controversies and discussions among the intellectuals of the time. Thus, Sartre (1946/2009) maintains - as one of his primary theses - that man does not possess an innate, natural and determined essence, but on the contrary, in man, existence precedes essence. Man is thrown into the world where he must constitute himself, make himself, that is, invent himself. This is why Sartre (1946/2009) points out that man "begins by being nothing" (p.31). From this nothingness he must shape a project towards the future that constitutes a subjectivity, an authentic mark of the subject that defines him, that identifies him. This project is only realized on the condition of what is done, of the acts actually performed, carried out around the project of wanting to be. Thus, Sartre (1946/2009) succinctly adds "(...) man begins by existing, that is to say, he begins by being something that launches itself towards a future and that is conscious of projecting itself towards the future" (p.32).

Now, following the above, if man must conceive of himself through a singular project oriented toward the future that differentiates him from the original nothingness, then man is inescapably responsible for his own existence. His very condition of man imputes to him a responsibility for his future that is linked to the project he carries out. In this respect, Sartre (1946/2009) affirms that "thus, the first step of existentialism is to put every man in possession of what he is and to place upon him the total responsibility for his existence" (p.33). Thus, here responsibility in the human being appears intimately linked to the set of acts that, on the other hand, constitute existence itself. The act is, in other words, existence.

On the other hand, this responsibility is also manifested in the fact that for the author, man is destined to be free, that is to say, there is a freedom that belongs to him and cannot be circumvented.



responsibility that such freedom entails. The atheistic existentialism professed by Sartre in rejecting the existence of God installs a scenario where the human being is alone, in absolute helplessness, without values and determinisms that reach him so that he can be fulfilled, so he must invent them. Thus, in this absence of God, the freedom that weighs on the human being and which he must take charge of is glimpsed. On this, Sartre (1946/2009) states:

This is what I will express by saying that man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he has not created himself and yet, on the other hand, free, because once thrown into the world he is responsible for everything he does (p. 43).

Thus, it is clear that freedom is not without responsibility. Freedom necessarily implies taking responsibility for what one chooses to be. Being condemned to be free also condemns man to be responsible. Responsibility is, then, an inexcusable value of human reality and inseparable from freedom.

Thus, this original helplessness of man and his condemnation towards freedom imprint on him the responsibility to realize himself, to build himself. Helplessness implies that we choose ourselves as our being (Sartre, 1946/2009, p. 43). Man must choose how to realize this freedom which is imputed to him and which entails responsibility. However, it is a choice whose freedom is immersed in a dialectical paradox, because since there are no determinisms, no God, no aliquid meanings, man is obliged to build a project oriented to the future on an original nothingness. Thus, the choice is obligatory, he has no other option: if he did not choose, he would also be doing so in a precise sense: not to choose also constitutes a choice. In other words, man is not free not to choose, not to make use of this freedom imputed without choice and to be responsible for what he decides to be.

The philosopher proposed here by Sartre rejects determinism and quietism, the inaction, the parsimony that excuses man from being what he could be. One is not born a certain way, but on the contrary, one chooses to be a certain way. There is no nature of cowardice or bravery: there are men who choose by means of the act, of actions, to be cowardly or brave (Sartre, 1946/2009, p. 43). In this way, the act is constituted as the means, the vehicle with which freedom is exercised and for which the human being is, from this logical point of view, responsible. The act always implies responsibility. On this, Sartre underlines that there is only hope in his action and that the only thing that allows man to live is the act (Sartre, 1946/2009, p. 43). In the same way, the act is also responsibility because when one chooses, it is not an atomized, individualized event that does not have repercussions on society, but the opposite. For Sartre, the choice made when the act is executed inevitably entails an additional responsibility precisely because it has an impact that reaches all of humanity. It is not a solitary act, it is an act that commits all human beings.

Therefore, in the act there is responsibility because there is necessarily commitment. Sartre points out that for us, on the contrary, man finds himself in an obligated situation, where he is himself committed, he commits the whole of humanity with his choice and cannot avoid choosing (Sartre, 1946/2009, p. 43). Thus, it is evident how here the notion of commitment is ever important for Sartrean thought.

On the other hand, what Sartre indicates in this conference is that responsibility is based precisely on the unavoidable illegitimacy of determinisms. When one appeals to them: psychosocial, biological, among others, man seeks to excuse himself from the unfortunate events of his life, from everything that is unpleasant, injurious, thus becoming a man of bad faith (Sartre, 1946/2009, p. 43).

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If there are determinisms, then it is possible not to take responsibility, to dissociate oneself from commitment and to evade freedom. Thus, Sartre (1946/2009) affirms that "bad faith is obviously a lie, because it conceals the total freedom of commitment. On the same plane, I will say that there is also bad faith if I choose to declare that certain values exist before me" (p.76). On the contrary, it is a matter of confronting the invention that requires existence and freedom as a condemnation of man, and precisely for this reason a meaning must be given to the existence that lacks it.

2.- Responsibility in the subject position.

Situating the notion of responsibility in Jacques Lacan's work poses at least one problem in principle. First of all, responsibility can be approached from the position of the analysand, that is, a subject who carries out an analysis with a psychoanalyst who, as Lacan (1966/2014c) warns, directs the cure. In the same way, one can address the responsibility related to the position of the psychoanalyst. It is a question, then, of the two positions that structure an analysis. There are variables, attributions and specificities that correspond to each of them and that Lacan took care to qualify throughout his teaching, although with evident differences. Therefore, to speak of responsibility in psychoanalysis can be a difficult obstacle to overcome if it is not clearly circumscribed to one of these two singular positions, i.e., if it is not clear which position is being referred to. However, it is also necessary to point out that a split should only be considered for the purpose of carrying out a theoretical analysis such as the one proposed here, since both positions, although in praxis they can - and usually do - present difficulties, impasses and ruptures, the immanent logic that structures them implies that they should be considered as a whole. Thus, in this research, the responsibility that is attributable to the position of the analyzing person will be mainly considered, since it allows a more accurate comparison to be made in relation to Sartre's proposal taken up here. However, this does not exclude the possibility that an inverse analysis - eluded here - may be equally pertinent.

In this sense, a fundamental and unavoidable reference - due to its relevance it will guide and order this section of the research and in turn will enable the appeal to other quotations - that can be found in Lacan's teaching is located in a text of his Writings called "Science and Truth". There, the French psychoanalyst states:

o sa that the subject on which we operate in ps choanal sis can onl be the subject of science ma seem paradoxical. t is there howe er that a demarcation must be made in the absence of which e er thin ets mixed up and a dishonest be ins that elsewhere is called objecti e but it is a lack of audacit and a lack of ha in detected the object that fails. e are alwa s responsible for our subject position acan, c, p. .

his quotation becomes primordial here because it introduces the dimension of the subject, which in the field of ps choanal sis is capital. hus, acan states that responsibilit corresponds to the subject position he refers mainl to the subject as it refers to the anal and. hat is to sa , the subject position implies takin responsibilit for it, or in other words, the human bein is responsible for his subject position, which ma emer e as we shall see later in an anal sis with an anal st. ow then, it is necessar to locate what acan is referrin to when he sa s subject position , that is, what are the characteristics and particularities he attributes to it. n this sense, first of all, it should be pointed out that for ps choanal sis framed in acan's teachin , the subject is not the indi dual. omeone who demands to under o ps choanal tic treatment is not a subject, but an indi dual who demands, in principle, to be in ps choanal tic treatment.

he subject position is a lo ical operation, not a chronolo ical one, and ma not e en emer e, but if it does, it is linked to the fact that this indi dual be an an anal sis and became an anal sand. omeone



can attend periodic meetings with a psychoanalyst for years and yet there is no elucidation of the subject position, which does not necessarily exclude that there were no "psychic improvements". Therefore, strictly speaking, Lacan's reference is attributable to the existence of an analysand, in other words, responsibility here is not possible if there is no analysand in play. An individual is not an analysand. An analysand is a logical operation that occurs, or can occur in transference with an analyst who operates with his desire. There is then a disjunction between individual and (position of) subject - analysand. In reference to what is a subject, Lacan (1966/2014c) adduces:

The status of the subject in psychoanalysis, shall we say that we have founded it last year? We finally arrive at establishing a structure that accounts for the state of splitting, of Spaltung in which the psychoanalyst detects it in his praxis. He detects this splitting in a certain everyday way. He admits it at the base, since the recognition of the unconscious alone is enough to motivate and since it also submerges him, if I may say so, with its constant motivation. (p.813)

For this reason, it is noted that for Lacan's perspective the subject is divided by the existence of the unconscious that is structured as a language. Lacan, by the mere acceptance of the unconscious and language as valid categories implies the inappropriateness of sustaining a complete subject as modernity has stoically maintained a rational subject, full conscious and with the infallible resource of the will. The latter position, far from being permitted, has been colonized in broad and diverse sectors of thought, even within the field of psychology itself, where it is often found to operate, and which decidedly antagonizes the subversive proposal of psychoanalysis. Thus, it is central to affirm then that the subject position to which Lacan attributes responsibility is precisely that of the subject divided by the signifier in function itself. This is central to the logical cohesion of this work.

Returning to the above, we must remember that for Lacan, as the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. In the pursuit of the figure of the Other, Lacan will say a plethora of things, he will define it in many ways, among them, the treasure of the signifier. In a sense, we can affirm that if there is subject there is other. The subject is not constituted without the figure of the Other or outside the Other. That is to say, the subject postulated by Lacan is the antithesis of an attempt at identification. In the same vein, Jacques-Louis Miller strongly warns that analysis addresses the subject and not the self, that is, a work of analysis does not aim at the psychology of the self. The self is not the subject, the two are dissimilar categories in the field of psychoanalysis. This is what Lacan in the seminar on psychosis argued that in analysis it is not a matter of operating in the sense of installing an orthopedics of the self. The latter implied a profound criticism of the author towards the ego psychology so prolific since Freud's death, even to this day. In this sense, the true subject is the subject of the unconscious, that which has validity, that which interests the analyst, is the subject of the unconscious, that of which the analysand himself knows nothing. Lacan, by this, in other words, the whole Freudian discourse to which Lacan returns with fidelity. A subject that does not respond to the logic of a modern subject governed by the empire of reason, who knows ever nothing about himself, who is fully aware of his being. On the contrary, it is a subject divided by the signifier in function itself and its relation to the Other. Thus, the subject of the unconscious is rupture, it is escape, it is parenthesis, it is continually raised in analysis. Jacques-Louis Miller on this concludes that at the level of objectivity the subject does not exist and it is the analyst's responsibility to produce, to create, another level proper to the subject.

Now then, it is interesting to note that for Lacan, according to what was mentioned above, analysis implies taking responsibility, responding for the place of enunciation, that is, responding to that which is one's own but foreign and which emerges in the encounter with an analyst. Far from resting in a determinism linked to



the figure of the Other, of the Freudian unconscious, Lacan postulates that there is a responsibility to face, to answer for. If every analyzand had as destiny what is determined in the unconscious, then there would be no rectification possible, there would be no admissible cure, existence would be only a tragic and inert determinism, a mere teleology. However, this should not lead to the confusion that from the analyst's side one has to operate along the lines of empathizing with the discourse of the analyst, nor to disengage him from the responsibility that is his responsibility, but rather to enable the signifiers that caused him as a subject to resonate in the analysis. In sincere line with this, Lacan (1981/2013) declares that "it is not enough to intervene the signifiers in this way: I pat you on the back...you are very gentle...you had a bad daddy...that will be fixed...You have to employ them for sure, make them resonate differently and know at least not to employ some" (p.459).

On the other hand, in direct relation to the notion of responsibility, Jacques-Alain Miller uses a concept that can - according to this author's theoretical perspective - be interpreted as synonymous. This author is one of the most illustrious exegetes of Lacan's work, widely recognized in the Lacanian field. Thus, Jacques-Alain Miller (2019) claims that "Lacan called subjective rectification when in the analysis the subject also learns his essential responsibility for what happens" (p.70). That is, this concept - subjective rectification - Miller takes it from Lacan's teaching, although with the paradox that Lacan uses it very few times in his work. Following this, in reference to said concept Lacan (1966/2014c) says:

There is nothing in common between his procession, which starts from the surface, and the subjective rectification, put in the foreground above in Freud's method, where, moreover, it is not motivated by any topical priority. It is also that this rectification in Freud is dialectical and starts from the subject's utterances in order to return to them, which means that an interpretation can only be exact if it is... an interpretation. (p.574).

In the same text called "The direction of the cure and the principles of its power" Lacan will also speak of rectification of the relations of the subject with the real. What is important in relation to these quotations is that Jacques-Alain Miller interprets them in the sense that in an analysis what it is about is that the analyzand makes a subjective localization in relation to what is said in that space, that is, that he makes a change of position with what is said in an analysis. That is to say, to make a certain passage from the position of complaint where the analyst locates the totality of the misfortunes of his life in the acts of others, to locating the responsibility in what he complains about, in what causes him suffering. In other words, to take a position in relation to what is enunciated, which is not all the result of an alien and injurious otherness. In direct line with this, Jacques-Alain Miller argues

What Lacan called subjective rectification is to move from complaining about others to complaining about oneself. We always have reasons to complain about others. It is a point, in fact a very refined one, that entry of the subject who says: "It is not my fault". Inversely, the analytic act consists in implicating the subject in that of which he complains, implicating himself in the things of which he complains. (p. 69-70)

Thus, in this way, we can see how in Jacques-Alain Miller's perspective, subjective rectification is an operative in which the analyst is involved in what happens to him/her, in what causes suffering. However, this operation does not consist of a suggestion from the analyst to the analyzand's ego, but is the result of the unfolding of the signifier chain through free association. Likewise, rectification here should not be understood in an orthopedic sense, of returning to the normal or what the analyst believes to be working correctly, which would be a sort of return to the expected morality, or as mentioned



at present, to the "adaptive". On the contrary, psychoanalysis is about something else. Exhorting those who come to an analysis to speak because something in their lives resonates as problematic can have as a consequence - this is what we try to achieve but does not always happen - the encounter with desire, with the signifiers coming from the Other, or in other words, with the lack of being of the speaker. It is precisely in relation to this that Lacan addresses himself when he assigns responsibility to the position of the subject.

3.- Differences and similarities around responsibility in Sartre and Lacan.

It was pointed out earlier in the text recovered here by Sartre that the philosophy he proposes fully rejects the incidence of determinisms in human reality. For the author, determinisms are neither legitimate nor valid excuses on which man can rest or excuse himself, but on the contrary, he must launch himself into the future with a project decided by himself. In other words, there are no determinisms on which man can evade the responsibility that corresponds to him, since existence necessarily entails responsibility. On the other hand, in Lacan's teaching, determinisms find a place that is perhaps a little more intricate, although it can be affirmed that they are also rejected if they are placed as a prevailing and teleological totality. This follows fundamentally from the fact that, on the one hand, it is undeniable how the incidence of the Other in the constitution of the subject was taken up earlier. The Other is an instance in which the subject is alienated and from which it must separate itself (Lacan, 1973/2016). The relation of the subject to the signifier is not without the place of the Other. That is to say, from this perspective, the interference of the field of the Other - where desire is situated - is flagrant. However, this does not mean that the existence of the Other is a definitive and absolute condemnation that imprints on the analysand the possibility of detaching himself from everything that happens to him and concerns him, that is to say, of fleeing completely from any element linked to the register of responsibility. It is necessary to clarify that this should not be translated as a supposed legitimization to apply a punitivist logic.

- he only wants to blame the analyst and for all the drama that plays him/her in life and for the miseries he/she may suffer. His perspective would be none other than the reverse of Lacan's criticism cited above - of ego psychologies whose primary technique is to empathize with the patient - patient on the back... you are entitled, placing victimization as a therapeutic proposal which would also lack an ethical perspective. In both, despite their differences, the subject position is eluded. Thus, returning to the above, Lacan's main pillar points out that it is a mistake to think, in analysis, that the unconscious is responsible for the things for which someone suffers. If this were the case we would deprive the subject of its responsibility. In other words, it is inadequate both to sustain an absolute and closed determinism coming from the Other thought of as a tragic and unchangeable destiny and to place full freedom outside the field of the Other. This binarism is sterile, improper and unproductive in the clinic.

The convenient position is more linked to a middle ground that is sustained in a certain ineffable and uncomfortable balance, that is to say, neither denial of the existence of the field of the Other nor affirmation of its existence as an irrefutable condemnation for the speaker. In other words, it is not a question of a full and closed determinism where responsibility would be circumscribed for the subject.

likewise, neither is it a question of a supposed total self-determination in the style of the modern, rational, full-conscious and voluntarist subject that is currently proposed where the analyst would indeed be an autonomous individual liable to the application of the punitivist logic that holds him solely responsible for the totality of events that have repercussions on him.

Thus, both positions from the psychoanalytic point of view are inadequate because they result in the evasion of the responsibility linked to the subject position as Lacan concluded. Moreover, for example, if the dimension of the Other were taken as an inexcusable determinism, then the Other's dimension of the subject would not be taken into account.



cess no subjective movement - at the level of the subject, of the signifying chain - would be possible within an analysis since the human experience would be a consummated and irreversible tragedy that would develop in a sort of cadence, of prefigured and unappealable inertia. On the contrary, psychoanalysis in its practice demonstrates that there is a vital margin for the analysand to make singular movements even when for him everything may be desolation. Here, in particular, there is a precise point of similarity between Sartre and Lacan, since in both thoughts there is materialized, even with their divergent particularities, the rejection of a useless pessimism that fatally condemns human reality. That is to say, each of them resists the idea that life must be a forced misfortune on which nothing can be done in any sense except the contemplation of the fall. Rather, both offer different answers to problems that, although stated as different, have in common the rejection of a puerile defeatism.

On the other hand, it was said earlier that in the existentialism professed by Sartre it is a matter of placing man in the position of what he is and of attributing to him the absolute responsibility that concerns him insofar as existence precedes essence. The human being is a project and there is nothing before this. But this responsibility not only reaches him but is extensible to all men, because in choosing the project man selects an image of himself that he identifies as correct for himself and for others, hence its link with humanism, logically. In choosing the project, otherness is included. Man does not choose what is wrong for himself, he chooses what he believes to be right, therefore, for all men as well. In this sense, the responsibility is much greater because the project that materializes in the acts includes all humanity. In relation to this, from the Lacanian perspective worked on here, responsibility presents evident differences with what is pointed out by Sartre. In the first instance, there is no linking of the responsibility of the subject with something of the collective order, of the whole of humanity. The position of the divided subject on which the responsibility is placed is clearly of the singular order, it excludes such a dilated extension. Secondly, in Lacan's teaching - who follows in Freud's footsteps - as has been said recently, responsibility is in relation to the subject position. Therefore, it is difficult to speak here of "what is" as Sartre argues, since psychoanalysis operates in precisely the opposite direction, that of non-knowledge (there is a disjunction between knowledge and truth) and this Sartrean proposition "of what is" necessarily implies knowledge about it, that is, man is aware that he must project himself into the future, as Sartre literally states it. It happens in the same way with the humanist quality of responsibility that Sartre endorses, where precisely this vestige of "knowing what I know what is" is observed, since precisely in deciding the project one is choosing all men according to what is believed to be correct for oneself, hence then this mass responsibility. One is responsible for oneself but also for others. Thus, for Sartre, man is placed in the position of "what he is" and this is linked to an inescapable responsibility to himself and to other men. One is responsible because one knows what one is. In a contrary sense, in an analysis one is responsible - one responds - for what one does not know in principle, because it emerges contingently through free association and with an analyst directing the cure. If it was said before that subjective rectification is an operation through which the analyst makes himself responsible for what he complains about and which usually has the content of blaming others - the others are always the unfortunate ones - then it is clearly evident that there is a dimension of not-knowing that is present. This place of enunciation, the confrontation with the enunciated, is not a knowledge operated prior to the entry into analysis but on the contrary is a logical operation resulting from the encounter with an analyst. In connection with this Lacan (1966/2014c) firmly states:

The unconscious, according to Freud, is a chain of signifiers that somewhere (on another stage, he writes) repeats itself and insists to interfere with the cuts offered by the effective discourse and cogitation that it informs. (p.760).



In this way, Lacan, taking up Freudian developments, recovers the idea of the unconscious as another scene, another scenario from where the signifying chain insists on interfering with the discourse of cognitive speech. This idea is clear, there is something unknown that from another place insists to emerge, that is why it is a disconti- nuity and unknown to the speaker. A little further on, Lacan (1966/2014c) succinctly adds:

Namely, the fair way to answer the question: Who is speaking? When it is the subject of the unconscious. For this answer could not come from him, if he does not know what he is saying, nor even that he is speaking, as the whole experience of analysis teaches us. (p.762)

Finally, from what has been worked on, it can be affirmed that both in Sartre's philosophical project and in the psychoanalysis developed by Lacan, the notion of responsibility presents a profuse ethical sense even when the foundations that sustain it are different. This is another similarity that can be established between the authors' works. It happens that responsibility in Sartre, in its intimate relationship with freedom, commitment and the act, forms a concept brimming with ethicity. Sartre's philosophical-political project is structured in an irrecusable ethics that is sustained on the foundation of freedom and responsibility, as we have seen here. When he points out that man is condemned to be free and that he must therefore take responsibility for the responsibility that this freedom entails - a freedom that disdains determinism and embraces commitment - Sartre is establishing with the utmost firmness the ethics he postulates. In other words, it can be said that he makes responsibility an ethic.

Similarly, the work on Lacan's teaching should not be dissociated from the ethic that pertains to it. Thus, the notion of responsibility approached from the analyst's point of view - the analyst's point of view undoubtedly carries this same quality - has an accentuated ethical character. When Lacan situates responsibility as a quality immanent to the position of the subject, the ethics that underlies it is located there. That is to say, it is from the notion of the subject that Lacan exhaustively describes where his ethic springs from and which also signifies a rejection of any identification, psychologization and an attempt to objectify the subject on the basis of moral categories of the epoch. As Jacques-Alain Miller (2019) rightly states "the category of subject, as such, cannot be placed except in the ethical dimension" (p.13). If the position of the subject imprints the making of oneself responsible, giving an answer for it, then this operative of responsibility is the bearer of an ethical condition.

CONCLUSIONS

According to what has been worked on here, elements linked to the notion of responsibility were taken up again from the work of Sartre and Lacan, which allowed to establish an approximation to the formulation made by both authors in their respective theoretical works. From this, a parallelism was made between the two perspectives, thus locating some differences and similarities between the authors in relation to responsibility from its different aspects.

In this sense, in connection with the similarities, it became evident how in both authors there is a rejection of determinism as a legitimate basis for evading responsibility concerning human experience. Likewise, in both Sartre and Lacan there is a prominent rejection of pessimism as a valid and resolute operation of the speaker. Likewise, a similarity was found with regard to the referent of the ethical dimension linked to the notion of responsibility that each of the authors employ. That is to say, in spite of the differences in the argumentative content, both in Sartre and Lacan there is an ethical sense linked to responsibility.



On the other hand, within the divergences that were worked here between the two perspectives, it was found that for Sartre responsibility has a much more extensible scope compared to Lacan's perspective. Similarly, the notion of knowing/not-knowing linked to human experience presents dissimilar positions between the authors.

Thus, in spite of the evident differences between the authors in relation to the field of disciplinary belonging, some conceptual similarities were found between them, with the notion of responsibility as a central element. It is necessary to clarify that what has been done here does not prevent the deepening of what has been worked on. On the contrary, the proliferation of the establishment of an intersection between both authors is extremely fertile. This is based on the fact that Sartre and Lacan, as mentioned at the beginning, not only coexisted historically but also formed part of the circle of preponderant intellectuals in France, both being aware of the intellectual work of the other. So much so that Jacques Lacan in several passages of his work refers to elements of Sartre's work, or of the existentialism that was in full force at the time. They even shared the lectures on Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave given by Alexandre Kojève. Thus, this is subject to future research where it would be useful to locate questions of utmost relevance such as: What substantial similarities and divergences can be located around the notion of the subject proposed by both authors? What contributions from Merleau-Ponty's teaching do Sartre and Lacan take up in order to develop their respective theories? What was the incidence of Marxist thought -so current at the time and among French intellectuals- in the work of both authors? What is the importance Lacan gives to the notion of freedom throughout his teaching? Does this notion have similarities with Sartre's proposal of freedom?



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