Leading the war, leading to peace. Leadership styles in Colombia (1982-2014)*

Liderar la guerra, liderar la paz. Estilos de liderazgo en Colombia (1982-2014)
Liderar a guerra, liderar a paz. Estilos de liderança em Colômbia (1982-2014)

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Abstract

This paper focuses on assessment of leadership style of political decision-makers between 1982 and 2014 who have played a central role in the development of public policies against the war and in favor of peace over more than fifty years of internal armed conflict. To do this, first, a theoretical framework is built. Secondly, a historical review is made. Third, the methodology of content analysis of interviews to assess leadership styles is set out. Fourth, results are analyzed. Finally, conclusions and future prospects are presented.

Key words: Style of leadership, Policy Peace, Armed Conflict, Content analysis, Colombia.

Resumen

En Colombia, los líderes políticos han tenido un papel central en las políticas de guerra y paz a lo largo de más de 50 años de conflicto armado. El objetivo de este artículo es evaluar el estilo de liderazgo de los líderes políticos en contexto de conflicto, acudiendo al caso de Colombia entre 1982 y 2014. Para ello, en primer lugar, se construye el marco teórico. En segundo, se lleva a cabo un repaso del contexto histórico. En tercer, se expone la metodología de análisis de contenido de entrevistas para la evaluación de los estilos de liderazgo. En cuarto, se analizan los resultados. Finalmente, se presentan las conclusiones y las perspectivas de futuro.

Palabras clave: Estilo de liderazgo, Políticas de Paz, Conflicto Armado, Análisis de contenido, Colombia.

Resumo

Na Colômbia, os líderes políticos têm desempenhado um papel central nas políticas de guerra e paz ao longo de mais de cinquenta anos de conflito armado. O objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar o estilo de liderança política no contexto de conflito recorrendo ao caso da Colômbia entre 1982 e 2014. Para fazer isso, em primeiro lugar, o marco teórico é construído. Em segundo lugar, se realizará uma revisão do contexto histórico. Em terceiro lugar, será exposta a metodologia de análise de conteúdo de entrevistas para a avaliação dos estilos de liderança discutidas. Em quarto lugar, serão analisados os resultados. Finalmente, as conclusões e as perspectivas futuras serão apresentadas.

Palavras-chave: Estilo de Liderança, Política de Paz, Conflito, Análise de Conteúdo, na Colômbia.

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Nowadays, Colombia is involved in a peace negotiation between the government and the insurgency that seeks to end more than 50 years of armed conflict. During his participation in a Forum for Peace in Colombia, on June 16, 2015, in Oslo, its president, Juan Manuel Santos, shared the following reflection with the attendees:

> I was told that exercising leadership in times of war, as I did when I was a Minister of Defense before becoming President - in fact being the most popular minister led me to the Presidency - is much easier than exercising leadership in a peace process (*El Tiempo*, 2015).

In a global context where politics is increasingly focused on the leader and less on political parties (Blondel & Thiébault, 2010, p.111), Santos' reflection raises the theme of the role of leadership in political decision-making and, specifically, those related to war and peace (MacFarland, 1969, pp. 174-175).

In Colombia, as in all of Latin America, the president occupies a central position in the political system, leads the way of defense, and has the power to make decisions relating to peace and conflict resolution (Bachelet, 2004, pp. 8-10). In addition, Colombian insurgent groups, especially the FARC-EP, have maintained a "stable vertical leadership" (Cepeda, 2001, p.15), with hierarchical structures in which a single individual retains control of the activities of the group (Bar-Yam, 2003).

Some jobs, some of them recent, from international relations (Byman & Pollack, 2001; Mares & Palmer, 2012) and social psychology (Hermann, 1999; Conway et al., 2001, 2003; Greenstein, 2004; Dyson, 2009; Foster & Keller, 2014), studied the style of leadership, that is, the set of personal and manifest characteristics of the leader (Hermann, 1977, p.2), in order to determine their impact on political decision-making. The main obstacle to this kind of work is limited access to empirical sources; to overcome this, some authors have designed *methodological techniques*, the majority based on the analysis of content, which assess leadership styles under the premise that the personal attributes that shape the leadership style of the leader are deducible through language (Hermann, 1999). One of the most used is the *Leader Trait Assessment* (LTA).

The aim of this article is to evaluate the leadership styles of Colombia's political leaders between 1982 and 2014. To do so, first of all, the theoretical framework is built. Second, a review of the historical context is carried out. Third, the methodology of the interview content analysis for the evaluation of leadership styles is presented. Fourth, the results are analyzed. Finally, the conclusions and future perspectives are presented.

1. Leadership style and policies of war and peace

In social psychology, the leadership style is the set of manifest personal characteristics deducible through language analysis, which can

influence, to a greater or lesser extent, their behavior in a given political context (Hermann, 1977, p. 2).

The personal characteristics are all aspects of an individual by their individual status; their biographical statistics, their formation, their experience, their abilities, their motivation or their beliefs and values. Features can be deep, such as the individual's emotional impulses and basic needs; or manifests, such as the ability to control the environment, the need for influence, the degree of openness of information and motivation. These last ones are those that conform the style of leadership (Hermann, 1977, p.2) and respond to two dilemmas that affect the political behavior: the leader's way of maintaining control over politics, delegating responsibilities or assuming the role of protagonist (reception to the external information); and how to shape the agenda of politics, prioritizing problems or social relations (motivation) (Hermann, 1999, p.4).

The development of studies on leadership styles begins during the first third of the 20th century and the majority came from the social psychology[1]. In the 1930's, Lewin et al (1939), carried out a controlled experiment to test the effects of different leadership styles on the behavior of individuals within groups. Two decades later, Lasswell (1963) elaborated a typology of leadership styles from the analysis of the clinical histories of political leaders.

Subsequently, other studies appeared that suggest other typologies. In political science they emphasize the studies of Wildavsky (1984), Nye (2008) and Burns (2010). In international relations and social psychology, the authors start of the idea that certain traits of the leader's personality can influence the decision-making process, basically in foreign policy (Kernberg, 1999, p.205). These traits allude to different dimensions of the personality of the leaders, and vary according to the objective and the hypotheses of each investigation.

Some of these works link the leadership style and the decision-making in armed conflict situation, where political leaders, within the framework of a negotiation, can agree on peace policies, which are decisions aimed at their resolution (Rivas, 2015, p.10).

Waltz (1957), Byman and Pollack (2001) and Mares and Palmer (2012) address this issue from the perspective of international studies. The first distinguishes three images (levels of analysis) to explain the behavior of the States and one of them is the personality and behavior of the leaders, but rejects this image considering that human nature is constant and that such explanations are not parsimonious (Waltz, 1957, pp. 80-81).

Byman and Pollack (2001, p.133) answer to Waltz critics, remarking the impact of indi-

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1   However, its precursors were Machiavelli and Weber, who raised typologies of styles that have influenced much in later works. On approaches and theories of leadership, see Rivas and Alcántara (2015).

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vidual leaders over the state's behavior through the review of some historical examples, and making some "plausible and testable" hypotheses. According to these authors, individual actors perform a main role in shaping the foreign policy of a State, including wars, alliances and the peace processes (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p.114).

In a recent study, Mares and Palmer (2012) try to explain the decisions about war and peace taken in the armed conflict between Peru and Ecuador (1995-1998) on the basis of various factors (structural, institutional and personal), including the personal characteristics of leaders. From two attributes, the ability to innovate and the willingness to take risks, provides diverse styles of leadership (Mares & Palmer, 2012, p.77). This work of Mares & and Palmer confirm one of the hypotheses presented by Byman and Pollack (2001, p.137), in which the leaders with greater willingness to take risk are more prone to cause war or prolong them.

Another group of authors that deals with the impact of leadership styles toward political decisions belongs to the social psychology field and it uses different techniques of analysis, including the one already mentioned LTA. Some academics, such as Greenstein (2004) and Hermann (1999), determine leadership styles based on multiple aspects of personality. The first one evaluates US president's styles from Franklin D. Roosevelt as of different attributes: communicative aptitude, organizational capability, political ability, vision, cognitive style and emotional intelligence.

Hermann (1999, p. 4), on the other hand, takes into account three dimensions and seven personality traits to construct eight leadership profiles: the belief in control of the environment and the need for power and influence, which configure the reaction to the restrictions of the environment; the degree of conceptual complexity and self-confidence that constitute openness to external information; and the tendency to solve problems, identification with the group and the degree of distrust towards other groups, which serve to evaluate the motivation. In this article, the leadership styles are evaluated addressing two of the three dimensions of personality proposed by Hermann (1999), the level of openness to information and motivation.

Other academics of leadership styles only take into account some of these personality dimensions. Some authors (Burke and Greenstein, 1991; Hermann & Preston, 1994; Conway *et al.*, 2001, 2003; Dyson, 2009), examine the degree of openness to information flows of political leaders. Burke and Greenstein (1991) compare Vietnam decisions about Eisenhower and Johnson, and observe how the first, more open to the information provided by his consultants, stood a different position to participate in Indochina war, whereas the second one, less receptive to external advisers, started a military intervention that, in time, would trigger to one of the greatest military defeats of the country.

Hermann and Preston (1994), study how

certain personal characteristics of the president which shape his leadership style influence the way they coordinate advisers and affect the decision-making process. According to these authors, leaders less sensitive to discrepant information, more confined and cognitively limited, establish more stable counseling systems; while the ones more receptive to external information, less confident and with better cognitive conditions, use more autonomous counseling structures, which vary in function of the situation (Hermann & Preston, 1994, pp. 93-94).

Conway *et al.* (2001, 2003) investigate the role of the *integrative complexity* in political decisions that leads to war or peace. This psychological construct, similar to Hermann conceptual complexity (1999), informed about the extent in which people distinguish different perspectives regarding a concrete matter (differentiation), and the extent in which these perspectives are related and integrate into one coherent framework. In times of crisis, leaders with low complexity in integration have a more rigid position and are more inflexible, so it is more likely to trigger a war; while leaders with high complexity are more flexible and cooperative and have more possibilities for peaceful settlement (Conway *et al.*, 2001, pp.69-70).

Finally, Dyson (2009) explains the foreign policy of Margaret Thatcher during the Falklands War, according to her cognitive ability. According to this author, the "Iron Lady "shows a low degree of conceptual complexity,

meaning, it has a worldview based on polarizing parameters (good-bad, friend-foe), which affects the processing of information received and decision-making in foreign policy.

All these authors, who evaluate leadership styles from the degree of openness to the information flows, start from the hypothesis that certain traits of the personality of the leader, such as a distorted vision of the reality and excessive self-confidence, increase the willingness to take risks, and therefore, the possibility to trigger or prolong conflicts and prevent negotiated settlements (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.137).

Another dimension of leadership style that has been autonomously analyzed is motivation. This field of study is one of the most varied of social psychology and various streams and methods can be distinguished in it.

The first group of authors (George, 1969; Walker, 1977; Schafer and Walker, 2006) uses an analysis technique of qualitative content, the *operational code*, to explain the relation between the leaders' motivational beliefs and their behavior in the formulation of policies. George (1969, pp.199-216) differentiates two types of cognitive beliefs, philosophical, refer to politics' nature and political conflict; and instrumental which shape political action and decision-making. Walker (1997) applies the operational code strategy to Kissinger and makes predictions about negotiating behavior of the government of the United States during

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Vietnam War. Nowadays, there is an entire school that applies this method in the study of political leader's decision (see Schafer and Walker, 2006).

The second group of academics, led by Winter, uses experimental techniques to analyze the effect of motivational attributes on decisions. For Winter (1973) there is a connection between the motivation for leader's power and their influence in the decision making within the groups. This author distinguishes three types of motivation: those of power, associated with social prestige and the impulse to take risks; those of affiliation, related to interpersonal relationships, membership of a group; and those of responsibility, linked to the need to act according to the consequences (Winter, 1973; 1991, pp.68-71). In their experiments, Winter (1991) concludes that in small business groups, a high level of power and responsibility motivation predicts the success of management in a span of time.

Unlike theorists of reception of information, academics who emphasize in the motivational traits defend the idea that the leaders motivated by the identification of group or distrust towards others groups have a belief system that lowers their critical capacity and increases their willingness to take risks and generate conflicts, which affects the formulation of government policies (Walker, 1990, p.403; Byman and Pollack, 2001, pp.137-138). On the contrary, leaders who emphasize common problems are more open to dialogue and negotiation (Hermann, 1999, p.26).

2. Methodology

This article is a descriptive work regarding the Colombia's case (1982-2014) that has as goal to evaluate the leadership style of political leaders on armed conflict setting, through the analysis technique of LTA quantitative content. In the future, this could help to prove the theoretical hypotheses that leadership style has an impact in the political decision-making on conflict setting, especially in war and peace politics.

Despite the armed conflict and its serious internal problems, Colombia is one of the most stable electoral democracies in the Hemisphere. According to the theory of leadership styles, when institutions are strong, there is less probability for individual leaders to implement their policies (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p.140); therefore, this country is chosen as a crucial case, the least likely. On the other hand, the leadership styles have been evaluated since 1982, because it was during the presidency of Betancur when the first policies of peace were developed in the framework of a negotiation with the insurgent groups.

The style of leadership is measured through a typology of own elaboration, inspired by the works of Lasswell (1963), Weber (1977) y Hermann (1986, 1999)[2], which is constructed by evaluating certain personal characteristics

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2   The proposed leadership styles are presented later (See Table II).

Table 1. Scheme classification

Dimension	Category	Codification units
Degree of openness to information flows	Lack of conceptual complexity	**Words:** Absolute, absolutely, definitely, doubt(less), certainly, full, fully, clear, clearly, obvious, obviously, evident, completely, quite, surely, total, totally, irreversible, irrevocable, finally, I have no doubt, no doubt, without hesitation, of course, I'm sure, no turning back
	Self-confidence	**Words:** I, my, myself, me, mine, confidence, conviction, I have been, a server, other self-references
Motivation	Tendency to solve problems	**Verb forms:** to advance, to solve, to overcome, to resolve, to restore, to restructure, to strengthen, to defeat, to stop, to finish, to terminate, to reduce, to accomplish, to achieve, to reach goals, to transforming
	Words: achievement, progress, success, goal, challenge, future	**Positive words to:** people, nation, country, homeland, patriot, independent, identity, self-determination, sovereign, (supra)region, poor, humble, grassroots, religion, God, Gospel, Bible, Jesus, social class (no middle)
	Identification with the group	**Positive words to:** people, nation, country, homeland, patriot, independent, identity, self-determination, sovereign, (supra)region, poor, humble, grassroots, religion, God, Gospel, Bible, Jesus, social class (no middle)
	Mistrust to other groups	**Words:** enemy, terror, terrorist, terrorism, subversive, rebels, traitors, bandits, separatists, extremism, radicalism, totalitarism, criminal group, oligarchy, caste, putsch, conspiracy, apostates, infidels, torture, genocide, massacre, extermination, dictatorship, authoritarian, domination, slaughter, destruction, bombs, bombing, disappearance, repression, forced displacement, threat, external threat, islamism, fundamentalism, wahhabism, Al-Qaeda, communism, chavism, fascism, imperialism, empire, imperial, superpower, WMD, chemical/nuclear weapons, occupation, occupants, invaders, colonial, other derogatory references

Source: Author's own work based on the work of Hermann (1999)

through the analysis of LTA[3] quantitative content.

Content analysis describes, in an objective and systematic way, the manifest content of a communication.

(Berelson and Lazarsfeld, 1948); and can be quantitative or qualitative. The latter carries out an examination of an individual's communicative material (Hermann, 1977, p.8), while the quantitative "directly accedes to the meaning of the different segments that compose the text without considering the actual textual material" (Lebart *et al*., 2000, p.4; Alonso *et al*., 2012).

The LTA technique is implemented in five steps or analytical stages. First, the material in which the analysis will be done is selected. In this case, answers from interviews made by non-research interviewers are used, taken

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3   Other techniques for assessing leadership styles are Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), and other forms of content analysis such as integrative complexity and operational code. The first, experimental and very expensive to apply to professional politicians, is used to assessing leadership styles in response to the motivational dimension (See Winter, 1991).

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from different mainstream media (press, radio, and television) and other secondary sources (academic interviews, foundations, NGOs, websites). This is because they are more available and a more spontaneous material than speeches.

Second, the text is decomposed into coding units, which are the linguistic elements that are quantified in each of the categories and dimensions of the analysis. Three types of units are distinguished: words, groups of words, phrases, quasi-sentences and complete text. The LTA technique counts words and groups of words[4]. It also takes into account the meaning of words and groups of words within the text, so the count is done manually.

Third, a classification scheme is created which contains the dimensions and categories that group the coding units. Taking as reference the work of Hermann (1999), the analysis is carried out on the basis of five exclusive categories grouped in two dimensions. As shown in Table 1, the first dimension, the degree of openness to information flows is formed by two categories: degree of conceptual complexity and self-confidence. Second, motivation contains three categories: problem orientation, identification with the group, and mistrust to other groups.

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4   The coding units are English words because the counting is done in interviews in this language.

Table 2. Categories and leadership styles

Dimension	Category	Style
Degree of openness to information flows	Lack of conceptual complexity	Manichean
	Self-confidence	Self-trusted
Motivation	Tendency to problems	Problem solver
	Identification with the group	Umbrella
	Mistrust to other groups	Distrustful
None of the above		Administrator

Source: Authors' own work based on the works of Lasswell (1963), Weber (1972) and Hermann (1986, 1999).

The lack of conceptual complexity indicates the extent in which the individual classifies objects and ideas and reacts to external incentives; the leader who lacks this quality classifies all its environment through polarizing parameters (black-white, good-bad) and is less flexible to incentives and situations. Self-confidence reports with the subject's ability to react and interact with objects and other subjects in the environment (Hermann, 1999, pp.20-22). The tendency towards problems reveals the degree of commitment of the leader with the goals of his organization. Identification with the group and mistrust towards other groups are attributes that allude to the leader's need to maintain the internal cohesion of his group, by praising their virtues, or generating mistrust towards other groups.

As shown in Table 2, the characteristics evaluated show different leadership styles, all except the administrator, which is assigned to leaders who lack all of the characteristics eval-

uated in each category. Manichaean-style leaders possess a degree of conceptual complexity below average and perceive reality in polarizing parameters. Those of self-confidence style have a great deal of confidence in themselves; these leaders have strong ideological convictions and are unresponsive to the external information (Hermann, 1999, p.18). Leaders with problem-solving style are motivated by the resolution of issues that most concern the group or political entity (Hermann, 1999, p.25). The main motivation of those who have umbrella style is to favor the group with which they identify and maintain their identity. The leaders with distrustful style are motivated by the group but are mainly concerned that other groups (governments, countries, "empires", "terrorist organizations") do not interfere in their affairs (Hermann, 1999, p.29). Finally, administrator-style leaders are those who have an average or low score in all categories of analysis; they are leaders that lack style, meaning, clear attributes that stand out from the rest. This style is similar to the Weberian category of professional politician and managerial style proposed by Lasswell (1963).

The fourth step to implement the content analysis technique is to create a coding manual, which should include an introduction where the objectives, concepts, and hypotheses of the research are collected; the selection of the material; the coding scheme; the definition of codes and categories; and the coding rules. The first three elements correspond to the three first analytical phases. As for coding, we use analyt-

ic codes, whose first digit indicates the dimension, and the second, the category. In relation to the last element, eight norms and eight rules have been constructed to ensure the validity and reliability of the evaluation of styles.

The last step is to proceed with the counting and the presentation of the results. By counting, the frequency in which words and groups of words are repeated in each category is calculated. The leader's characteristics are evaluated by applying, in each one of them, a mathematical operation of own elaboration inspired by the work of Hermann (1999, p.32):

$$\text{Category} = \overline{X} \text{ leader } \overline{X} \text{ total} > \sigma/2$$

According to this formula, a leader has an analytical category when the result of the difference between the leader's average and the total is greater than half of the typical deviation of that category.

3. Historical context

Colombia is one of the most stable electoral democracies in the continent, with elections and uninterrupted presidential mandates since 1958, however, it carries serious internal problems, most of them, the result of more than half a century of violence and armed conflict. As Kruijt (2010, p. 165) argues, Colombia experiences the paradox of "stability in instability "; the mechanism of democratic election remains constant while, within its territory, there is a "systematic violation of the most elementary human rights" (Cepeda, 2001, p.19); to the

point that, for a while, the country was classified as a collapsed or failed state (González, 2003).

Since its independence, Colombia's history has been marked by political violence. During the nineteenth century, several civil wars ensued between the liberal and conservative parties; after a period of relative tranquility during the first third of the twentieth century, the assassination of the liberal leader Gaitán in 1948 unleashed a new phase of partisan confrontation, known as *La Violencia*, which culminated with the dictatorship of General Rojas Pinilla in 1953. In 1958, liberals and conservatives agreed with the return of the elections and agreed to establish a political regime, the National Front (1958-1974), which excluded all other Colombian political forces from power.

According to Salamanca (2008, p. 20), the conformation of the National Front showed that political participation in Colombia "was a matter of elites". Hence, in the mid-1960s, political forces that had been excluded by the regime, mostly from rural origins, "declared war on the state" (Nasi, 2010, pp.64-75). With the creation of the first insurgent groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC- EP), the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), began the current armed conflict. Three years after the allegations of fraud in presidential elections in 1970, the 19 de Abril Movement (M-19) was founded, an urban guerrilla of nationalist ideology (Pizarro,

1996); and in the 1980s, some minor insurgent organizations were organized, mostly integrated by dissidents from other groups.

From the late 1970s, armed conflict became more complex due to the formation of new armed groups at the margin of the State: the paramilitaries, counterinsurgency organizations that had links with the State Public Force, and the drug cartels, which acquired a major role during the 1980s and early of 1990 (García, 1992, p.40).

With the arrival to the presidency of Belisario Betancur in 1982, the first peace policies were initiated in the framework of a negotiation with the insurgent groups, which was the first attempt to find a peaceful solution to the Colombian armed conflict since its inception in 1964 (García, 1992, p. 48). Since then, the theme of peace has become the "nodal point of the political life of the country" (Palacios, 2001, p. 41) and most of the political leaders, both executives, and insurgents, have tried to end the conflict by negotiation.

4. Leadership styles in Colombia (1982-2014)

In order to achieve the objective, the leadership style of Colombian political leaders is evaluated between 1982 and 2014. Next, the conditions and the names of the different analyzed leaders are related: Belisario Betancur, Virgilio Barco, César Gaviria, Ernesto Samper, Andrés Pastrana, Álvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos; The insurgent leaders of the FARC-

EP Manuel Marulanda, Alfonso Cano and Timoleón Jiménez; ELN leaders Manuel Pérez and Nicolás Rodríguez; and the leaders of the M-19, Jaime Bateman, Álvaro Fayad and Carlos Pizarro.

Leaders of smaller insurgent groups are excluded because of the difficulty of obtaining sufficient interviews to evaluate their styles of leadership; as well as leaders of paramilitary groups and criminal organizations linked to drug trafficking because they have no insurgent nature[5]. Neither is taken into account the leader of the M-19, Ivan Mariano Ospina, since only 11 months after assuming the leadership of the organization because of the death of Bateman, was set aside by his own comrades for his hard line and his "blunder" when applauding the threats made by the mafia to US residents in Colombia; in addition, six months later, he was shot down by the Army (*Semana*, 1985).

The interviews used to evaluate the styles and to calculate the averages are collected in a database, of own elaboration, that contains 360 responses from interviews of 68 global political leaders from 1979 to 2015, taken from various media and other secondary sources (academic interviews, foundations, NGOs, websites).

In order to have a greater amount of inter-

views and harmonize the word count, the database only includes interviews in English or translated into English[6].

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the content analysis. In general terms, Colombian's leaders get higher scores in the categories related to the degree of openness to information flows than those who evaluate motivation. In addition, 12 of the 15 scored in one of the categories and five of them, all executive leaders, do it in more than one.

With the first category, lack of conceptual

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5   An insurgent is defined as a group of organized and political nature, with the protagonist of an actor or group of actors, which prolongs the confrontation with the established policy and adopts a fighting strategy based on social mobilization and the use of force (Jordan, 2011).

6   The database includes leaders of States, not recognized (all States), Central Government and autonomous regions: Gerry Adams (North Ireland), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Iran), Patricio Aylwin (Chile), Shamil Basayev (Ichkeria), Virgilio Barco (Colombia), Jaime Bateman(Colombia), Belisario Betancur (Colombia), Tony Blair (United Kingdom), George W. Bush (United States), David Cameron (United Kingdom), Alfonso Cano (Colombia), Che Shui-Bian (Taiwan), Bill Clinton (United States), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), Susana Díaz (Andalucía) and Mauricio Funes (El Salvador), Muammar Gaddafi (Libya), Antonio García (Colombia), César Gaviria (Colombia), Mikhail Gorbachev (Soviet Union), Hu Jintao (People's Republic of China), Juan José Ibarretxe (Basque Country), Pablo Iglesias (Spain), Lech Kaczynski (Poland), Ramzan Kadyrov (Chechnya), Salva Kiir Mayardit (South Sudan), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil) , Ma Ying-Jeou (Taiwan), Ivan Marquez (Colombia), Manuel Marulanda (Colombia), Arthur Mas (Catalonia), Aslan Maskhadov (Ichkeria), Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), José Mujica (Uruguay), Antonio Navarro Wolf (Colombia), Tanja Nijmeijer (Colombia), Barack Obama (United States), Arnaldo Otegi (Basque Country), Andrés Pastrana (Colombia), Manuel Pérez (Colombia), Gustavo Petro (Colombia), Sebastián Piñera (Chile), Vladimir Putin (Russia), Jordi Puyol (Catalonia), Mariano Rajoy (Spain), Nicolas Rodriguez (Colombia), José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (Spain) , Dilma Rousselff (Brazil), Tony Saca (El Salvador), Alex Salmond (Scotland), Ernesto Samper (Colombia), Juan Manuel Santos (Colombia), Jesus Santrich (Colombia), Arnold Schwarzenegger (California), Manmohan Singh (the India), Horst Seehofer (Bavaria), Hashim Thaci (Kosovo), Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom), Julio César Turbay (Colombia), Doku Umarov (Ichkeria, Emirate of the Caucasus), Alvaro Uribe (Colombia), Xi Jinping (People's Republic of China), Boris Yeltsin (Russia), Jacob Zuma (South Africa).

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Table 3. Leadership styles: Evaluation results

Leader	Interviews	Words	Lack of conceptual complexity(2)		Self-confidence(2)	
			$\overline{X}$	σ	$\overline{X}$	σ
	353	756.270	0,30	0,24	2,19	1,54
			$\overline{X}$ líder	$\overline{X}$ líder – $\overline{X}$ total	$\overline{X}$ líder	$\overline{X}$ líder – $\overline{X}$ total
Belisario Betancur	6	11.897	0,43	0,12*	1,554	-0,6
Virgilio Barco(1)	3	2.920	0,52	0,22*	2,215	0,03
César Gaviria	7	8.882	0,79	0,49**	1,897	-0,29
Ernesto Samper	7	10.633	0,58	0,28**	4,228	2,04**
Andrés Pastrana	6	10.593	0,43	0,13*	2,245	0,06
Álvaro Uribe	7	10.108	0,28	-0,02	3,467	1,28*
J. Manuel Santos	5	12.586	0,39	0,09	3,220	1,03*
Manuel Marulanda	4	10.140	0,21	-0,09	0,334	-1,85
Jaime Bateman	5	10.063	0,37	0,07	1,704	-0,48
Manuel Pérez	3	8.614	0,37	0,07	1,288	-0,90
Álvaro Fayad	3	11.358	0,15	-0,15	0,230	-1,96
Carlos Pizarro	3	9.926	0,37	0,07	1,240	-0,95
Nicolás Rodríguez	6	10.058	0,24	-0,06	0,883	-1,30
Alfonso Cano	3	12.646	0,34	0,03	0,240	-1,95
Timoleón Jiménez(1)	5	5.690	0,45	0,15*	0,352	-1,83

Leader	Tendency to solve problems (2)		Identification with the group(2)		Mistrust to other groups	
	$\overline{X}$	σ	$\overline{X}$	σ	$\overline{X}$	σ
	0,41	0,31	0,33	0,62	0,25	0,35
	$\overline{X}$ líder	$\overline{X}$ líder – $\overline{X}$ total	$\overline{X}$ líder	$\overline{X}$ líder – $\overline{X}$ total	$\overline{X}$ líder	$\overline{X}$ líder – $\overline{X}$ total
Belisario Betancur	0,41	0,00	0,53	0,20	0,250	0,00
Virgilio Barco(1)	0,53	0,12	0,20	-0,13	0,303	0,05
César Gaviria	0,38	-0,03	0,08	-0,25	0,481	0,23*
Ernesto Samper	0,22	-0,19	0,12	-0,20	0,236	-0,01
Andrés Pastrana	0,79	0,38**	0,32	-0,01	0,271	0,02
Álvaro Uribe	0,44	0,03	0,19	-0,13	0,689	0,44**
J. Manuel Santos	0,61	0,20*	0,10	-0,23	0,173	-0,08
Manuel Marulanda	0,23	-0,18	0,33	0,00	0,417	0,17
Jaime Bateman	0,32	-0,09	0,66	0,33*	0,396	0,15
Manuel Pérez	0,32	-0,09	0,97	0,64**	0,411	0,16
Álvaro Fayad	0,24	-0,17	0,34	0,01	0,357	0,11
Carlos Pizarro	0,40	-0,01	0,35	0,02	0,337	0,09
Nicolás Rodríguez	0,53	0,12	0,51	0,18	0,610	0,36**
Alfonso Cano	0,43	0,02	0,29	-0,04	0,549	0,30*
Timoleón Jiménez(1)	0,42	0,01	0,35	0,02	0,346	0,10

* $\overline{X}$ leader– $\overline{X}$ total> σ/2 - ** $\overline{X}$ leader – $\overline{X}$ total> σ - (1) Provisional results due to the minimum number of interviews required for these leaders is not available. (2) All values expressed as percentages.
Source: Self-made.

complexity, five of seven Presidents, Betancur, Barco, Gaviria, Samper, Pastrana, and only one of the eight insurgent leaders, Jimenez have it. Samper and Gaviria have the higher averages, the first one obtains a difference of 0.28 averages, something greater to the typical deviation of the sample, while the second one is located almost 0.25 points above the same. Based on these results, all of these leaders possess a manichean style of leadership, with greater intensity in the cases of Samper and Gaviria. The leaders that possess this style tend to understand the political reality in polarizing parameters, do not listen to their advisors and are less flexible at the time of taking decisions.

Table 4. Leadership styles: leaders and styles

Leader	Leadership styles
Belisario Betancur	Manichean
Virgilio Barco(1)	Manichean
César Gaviria	Manichean and mistrust
Ernesto Samper	Manichean and self-confident
Andrés Pastrana	Manichean and problem-solver
Álvaro Uribe	Self-confident and mistrust
J. Manuel Santos	Self-confident and problem-solver
Manuel Marulanda	Administrator
Jaime Bateman	Umbrella
Manuel Pérez	Umbrella
Álvaro Fayad	Administrator
Carlos Pizarro	Administrator
Nicolás Rodríguez	Mistrust
Alfonso Cano	Mistrust
Timoleón Jiménez(1)	Manichean

(1) Provisional results due to the minimum number of interviews required for these leaders are not available.
Source: Self-made.

In the category that measures self-confidence only three of the 15 leaders, Samper,

Uribe and Santos, the three presidents, make an average difference over half of the standard deviation. Samper is the highest score, with a difference that exceeds the standard deviation by more than half a point. It should also be noted that all insurgents have scores below of the average, a pattern that is repeated in other insurgent leaders of the world evaluated in other similar works (see Rivas & Tarín, 2014, Rivas, 2015). According to the evaluation, Samper, Uribe, and Santos are leaders of self-confident style, more intense in the first. Self-confident styled leaders have a tremendous confidence in themselves, strong moral and ideological convictions, and are unreceptive to external information when they question their own certainties.

In the categories that evaluate motivation the results are more diverse. The presidents Pastrana and Santos score high in the problem-solving category. Santos is slightly more than two points above the average, with a difference greater than half of the standard deviation, while Pastrana obtains an average that almost doubles the total average and a difference superior to the standard deviation in 0.08 points. According to these results, both leaders are problem solvers, with a more marked style in the case of Pastrana. Leaders with this style are committed to the goals of the group and the issues that afflict it are their main concern.

As for the identification category with the group, the insurgent chiefs Bateman and Perez get a high score. The first one has an average

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Leading the war, leading to peace. Leadership styles in Colombia (1982-2014)

that doubles the total average and is somewhat greater than the standard deviation of the sample, while the second triples the average and is somewhat above the standard deviation. According to the evaluation, Bateman and Pérez have an Umbrella style, more common in insurgent and opposition leaders (Rivas and Tarín, 2014, Rivas, 2015). This style manifests itself with greater intensity in the case of Bateman. Umbrella leaders are motivated by the group and seek to strengthen their identity in order to carry out actions that favor it.

In relation to the mistrust towards other groups, it is noticed that there is not such a marked difference between executive leaders and insurgents as in the other categories.

Presidents Gaviria and Uribe and insurgents Rodriguez and Cano score high. Gaviria and Cano have a difference of average over half of the standard deviation, while in the cases of Uribe and Rodríguez that difference is situated 0.09 and 0.01 points respectively, above the value of the standard deviation. According to these results, the four are leaders of distrustful style, although it is more marked in Uribe and Rodríguez. Leaders of this style are motivated by the group, but they are concerned, above all, that other groups (e.g. groups of terrorists or foreign governments) do not interfere in the internal affairs of theirs.

Finally, three leaders, Marulanda, Fayad and Pizarro, all insurgents, do not score in any of the categories; average in all categories, ex-

cept for self-confidence, with below average scores. These types of leaders do not have a proper style but are characterized by not possessing the personal characteristics evaluated.

5. Conclusions and future perspectives

From the evaluation of the leadership styles of the leaders of Colombia it is important to highlight several aspects. First, although the scores are higher in the categories of the degree of openness to information flows than in those that assess motivation, there are a similar number of leaders that possess characteristics located in one and another personality dimension.

Second, leadership styles vary depending on the type of leader. From the evaluated leaders, five of the six manicheans are executives and only one is an insurgent, all self-confident leaders and problem solvers are executives and all in umbrella style are insurgents; nevertheless, the distrustful style is given equally to leaders of both types.

Third, of the 15 leaders surveyed, two-thirds have a unique leadership style and the remaining third (all executive leaders) has two. The style that most repeats itself is the Manichean and the less repeating are umbrella and problem solver. Also, there are only three administrator leaders, meaning that they do not have any of the characteristics evaluated.

Nevertheless, some problems are perceived in the use of this technique of evaluation. On one hand, the construction of a typology of

inclusive leadership styles makes it difficult to corroborate hypotheses and to examine relationships of causality; this problem could be solved by constructing a more exclusive styles typology, taking into account the dimensions, or combining content analysis with other analytical techniques. On the other hand, the presence of bias in the selection of interviews, inevitable in the content analysis, which can be tempered with the inclusion of norms and rules that guarantee the validity and reliability of the results.

In the future, the hypotheses should be checked in the theoretical framework, the rest of explanatory variables should be included and the universe of cases should be expanded, thus contributing to the development of research that may be able to answer the question of the role that leaders have in political processes.

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